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NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action commenced by Plaintiffs-Respondents
for enforcement of a provision in a Uniform Real Estate
Contract relating to assumptions of encumbrances and for
reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred as a result
of Defendants' breach of contract.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The lower court denied Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
and Motion for Summary Judgment and granted Plaintiffs'
Motion for Sununary Judgment ordering inunediate transfer of
title to certain real property from Defendants to Plaintiffs
and further ordering both parties to bear their own costs
and attorneys' fees.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs-Respondents seek affirmance of the lower
court judgment requiring Appellants-Defendants to convey
their rights, title, and interest as to the property involved
in this litigation but seek a reversal of the lower court's
order denying Plaintiffs-Respondents' attorneys' fees and
costs at the trial level.

In addition, Respondents seek

attorneys' fees and costs for defense of this appeal.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondents do not seriously disagree with the Statement of Facts preferred by the Appellants.

However, Respon-

dents believe that some of the "facts" are irrelevant for
purposes of review of this Sununary Judgment proceeding and
further that arguments of counsel (cited by Defendants) do
not constitute evidence sufficient to establish facts which
Appellants now argue.

For these reasons, therefore, Respon-

dents shall state the facts which they believe are both
relevant and supported by competent evidence.
On December 20, 1975 Appellants purchased property
located in Panguitch, Utah from Vance Pope and Emily Pope.
The contract consisted of a separately typed agreement since
no standard real estate printed forms were utilized.

(R. 7-19).

The agreement called for purchase of the "Bryceway Motel and
Restaurant" at a purchase price of $270,000 at a rate of 7%
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interest.

The contract contained a schedule of payments to

be made in January and.July of each year until the balance
had been paid.
Paragraph 5 of this Agreement recognized the existence
of prior obligations on the property and stated that the
sellers (Popes) agreed to assume and pay the obligations
and to hold the buyers harmless.

Paragraph 6 of that agree-

ment forbid the sellers (Popes) from obtaining additional
loans on the property other than the two previously described
obligations without the consent of the buyers.
As additional security for the transaction the buyers
(defendants herein) also pledged property located near Panguitch Lake and their personal residence.

The agreement

provided that when the balance of the contract was reduced
to $200,000 that these properties would then be released.

(R.l

The Pope-Farnsworth agreement (hereinafter "Pope Contract"
encompassed a motel, cafe, trailer park, all of the personal
property and water rights needed to operate these enterprises,
and in addition three residential dwellings which generated
rental income.
In April of 1978 a sale of the motel, cafe, and trailer
park was negotiated between Defendants and plaintiffs Nick
Faulkner and his wife Karyl.

In order to effectuate a tax-

free exchange the motel property was purchased in the name of
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Tom C. Thorpe.

(R. 4-5) •

The contract was immediately assigned

(R. 6).

by Thorpe to plaintiffs Faulkner.

The purchase from

the defendants encompassed all of the property previously sold
to them by Popes with the exception of the three residential
rental properties.
The Farnsworth-Thorpe contract (hereinafter "Thorpe
Contract") provided for a purchase price of $300,000, a down
payment of $35,000, and required a monthly payment together
with specified balloon payment.

An 8% interest rate was

imposed.
The Thorpe Contract was contained on a printed Uniform
Real Estate Contract form which had been filled out by
respondent Nick Faulkner who was a real estate agent and broker.
Paragraph 6 of the Thorpe Uniform Real Estate Contract
stated the following:

"It is understood that there presently

exists an obligation against said property in favor of
George H. Talbot and H. Vance Pope with an unpaid balance
of $

---------

as of

~-------------

the sellers obligation to pay and discharge."

which shall be
(Emphasis added

as to typed portion of paragraph) .
Paragraph 8 of the agreement provided the following:
The Seller is given the option to secure,
execute and maintain loans secured by said
property of not to exceed the then unpaid contract
balance hereunder, bearing interest at the rate of
not to exceed 8% per annum and payable in regular
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monthly installments; provided that the aggregate
monthly installment payments required to be made
by seller on said loans shall not be greater than
each installment payment required to be made by
the buyer under this contract. When the principal
due hereunder has been reduced to the amount of
any such loans and mortgages the seller agrees
to convey and the buyer agrees to accept title
to the above-described property subject to said
loans and mortgages.
In September and November of 1980 Respondents through
their. attorney made written demand upon Appellants for conveyance of the property subject to the Pope Contract.
Appellants refused to make such conveyance and insisted that
the terms of the Thorpe Contract be enforced.
This action was commenced by plaintiffs N.ick Faulkner
and his wife seeking a declaration that the defendants had
breached the terms of paragraph 8 by their failure to convey
title to the plaintiffs, seeking an order of the court
requiring such conveyance be made, and requesting costs and
reasonable attorneys' fees.

(R. 1-3).

On March 5, 1981 Defendants moved to dismiss on the
basis that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim against Defendants and had failed to join an indispensible party.
43-44).
(R.

(R.

The motion to dismiss was denied by the lower court.

102) .
A motion for summary judgment was made in September of

1981 by the plaintiffs.

(R. 108).

A hearing was held in the

lower court on October 16, 1981 at which time the parties
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agreed that Defendants' prior motion for dismissal could be
treated as a motion for summary judgment.

(Tr. 45).

The

lower court determined that the contract was not ambiguous
and ordered Defendants to execute all necessary documents
to transfer all right, title, and interest in the property
at the time Plaintiffs tendered to Defendants the monetary
difference existing between the Pope Contract balance and
the Thorpe Contract balance.

(R. 135-136) .

The court also ordered each side to bear its own costs
and attorneys' fees.

(R. 136).

The reason for this ruling

was stated by the lower court at the hearing as follows:
Well, as far as I am concerned, the court
finds that the plaintiffs prepared the contract
and I am not going to grant attorneys' fees in
this matter; I am not going to grant costs.
I
feel that's laying it on top and I am not going
to do it.
I am making a specific finding for
no attorneys' fees and costs awarded in this
matter.
(Tr. 49).
On November 25, 1981 Defendants filed their Notice of
Appeal from the lower court order.

On December 14, Plaintiffs

filed a cross-appeal as to the failure of the lower court
to award costs and attorneys' fees.

(R. 153) .

On this same

date the lower court granted a stay until final determination
of the appeal.

(R. 151).
ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE FARNSWORTH-THORPE REAL ESTATE CONTRACT WAS
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NOT AMBIGUOUS AND THEREFORE SUMMARY JUDGMENT
WAS PROPER.
Defendants-Appellants argue that sununary judgment was
improper in this case since the Thorpe Contract was ambiguous
and required extrinsic evidence to determine the intention
of the parties.

(Appellants' Brief, pp. 6-9).

This argument,

however, is without merit since the real estate contract is
not ambiguous and therefore requires no factual determination.
Respondents do -not disagree with the authorities cited
by Appellants as to the standard of review for summary judgment
and for interpretation of written contracts.
Brief, pp. 6-7).

(Appellants'

These authorities cited by Appellants clearly

state that a contract must be interpreted within its own four
corners unless it is "ambiguous" and extrinsic facts are
required to determine the intent of the parties.
Whether a contract is ambiguous or uncertain is a
question of law to be initially determined by the trial court.
Evenson Masonry, Inc. v. Eldred, 543 P.2d 663 (Ore. 1975).
The lower court in this case specifically held that the contrac
was not ambiguous.

(Tr. 4 8) .

Language in a contract is "ambiguous" when the words
used to express the meaning and intention of the parties are
insufficient in that the contract may be understood to reach
two or more possible meanings.

First National Bank of Olathe

v. Clark, 602 P.2d 1299 (Kan. 1979).

Ambiguity in a contract
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is the effect of words that have either no definite sense or
have more than one, causing doubt by reasonable men of its
meaning.

Bartlam v. Tikka, 622 P.2d 1130 (Ore. App. 1981).

See also, Amoco Production Co. v. Stauffer Chemical Co. of
Wyoming, 612 P.2d 463 (Wyo. 1980); State v. Fairbanks North
Star Borough School District, 621 P.2d 1329 (Alaska 1981).
Two other rules of construction should also be noted.
First, courts will not torture words and phrases to import
ambiguity where their ordinary meaning leaves no room for
ambiguity.

Lampley .v. Celebrity Homes, Inc., 594 P.2d 605

(Colo. App. 1979).

Second, the mere fact that parties urge

diverse definitions of contract terminology or differing
contract interpretations does not render the contract ambiguous.
Land v. Land, 605 P.2d 1248 (Utah 1980); Jones v. Hinkle,
611 P.2d 733 (Utah 1980).
A review of the Thorpe Contract shows that it is clearly
not ambiguous.

Appellants assert, to the contrary, that

paragraph 6 is inconsistent with paragraph 8 in that paragraph
6 recognizes the Pope obligation and then states {in type)
that it shall be the ''seller's obligation to pay and discharge."
Appellants assert that this is inconsistent with the language
(in print) contained in paragraph 8 because it is unclear
whether the Pope obligation is included as a "loan secured
by said property."

(Appellants' Brief, PP· 7-8) •

-8-

Appellants
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further argue that "the parties apparently expressed their
intent to exclude the Pope obligation from the applicability
to paragraph 8 by the typed clause of paragraph 6."

(Appel-

lants' Brief, p. 8).
This argument is without substance.

Paragraph 6

recognizes the Pope mortgage and provides that the seller
is obligated to pay and discharge it.

There is nothing

unusual or ambiguous about this provision since it is

m~rely

stating that the sellers are responsible for the Pope loan
and that as of the moment of contract it has not been assigned
to the buyer as his obligation.

Paragraph 8, on the other

hand, states that at such time when the balance of any loan
falls below the amount owed on the contract that the buyer
can assume such loan and mortgage and that the sellers must
convey title.

There is no language contained in paragraph 8

excepting the Pope Contract from its provision.
This Court in Jones v. Hinkle, 611 P.2d 733 (Utah 1980)
dealt with almost an identical argument advanced by the defendant in that case who also refused to convey title when the
plaintiff buyer demanded it.

This Court stated:

Paragraph 3 of the contract provides for
full payment each month "until contract balance
is paid in full." Defendants argue that the
typewritten language of paragraph 3 of the
contract supercedes the printed language of
paragraph 8.
It is defendants' position that
the parties contemplated a continuing contract
until the full purchase price was paid.
If this
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position were correct, paragraph 8, providing
for conveyance of title before full payment of
the purchase price, would have no meaning. It
is axiomatic that a contract should be interpreted so as to harmonize all of its provisions.
Vance v. Arnold, 114 Utah 463, 201 P.2d 475 (1949).
This Court then continued to explain why paragraph 8 was
applicable.

It stated:

Although paragraph 3 of the real estate
contract sets out the basic payment scheme, it
does not mandate specified monthly payments as
the only method of making payment. Paragraph
4 provides for the payment of amounts in excess
of the regular monthly payments, and accelerated
payments are allowed by paragraph 9 of the contract.
It is significant that paragraph 9
expressly refers both to loan obligations outstanding at the date of the contract and to
obligations incurred after the execution of the
contract. Paragraph 8 applies to "any" loan
secured by the property and does not expressly
exclude the existing mortgage identified in
paragraph 6.
In our view, paragraph 3 does not
preclude the right to conveyance of title pursuant
to paragraph 8 according to the clear terms of
that provision and in light of the language of
paragraph 9.
Id. at 735.
(Emphasis added).
Here, there is nothing in the contract which precludes
the buyer from assuming the sellers' obligation to pay and
discharge the Pope Contract.

There is no language contained

in paragraph 8 excluding the Pope mortgage as a "loan" as
contained in that paragraph.

Just as in Hinkle, the agree-

ment in this case is not ambiguous and clearly allows the
assumption of the existing Pope mortgage at such time as the
balances conformed with the requirements of paragraph 8.
Next, Appellants attempt to argue that the initial

-10-
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balances between the Pope Contract and the Thorpe Contract
indicate an ambiguity since at the time of the contract the
Pope balance was only slightly higher than the Thorpe balance
and therefore Clause 8 would have taken effect immediately.
(Appellants' Brief, pp, 8-9).

This argument is also without

merit.
First, there is nothing contained in the contract
itself which shows the balance of the Pope Contract and
therefore any after-acquired escrow balances are extrinsic
evidence which is not admissible unless the contract itself
is ambiguous.

Second, the initial balances of the contract

changed almost immediately and as stated by Defendants themselves, in September and November of 1980 the Pope obligation
was some $4,000 below the Thorpe obligation.

(R. 86).

Plaintiffs in November of 1981 tendered the then-existing
difference of some $6,000 to the defendants in order to
equalize the contract which would then activate the language
contained in paragraph 8.

(R. 133-134).

It is clear that

the structure of the contracts provided for a fluctuation in
the difference between the two balances and therefore the
initial balances are no more relevant to the intent of the
parties than are the balances three or four years subsequent
to the agreement.
There is no evidence that the underlying Pope balance
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was ever considered in the Thorpe Contract or that Thorpe
or the plaintiffs had any knowledge of the balance.

It is

submitted, however, that such a determination as to the
actual balances or the knowledge of the parties as to the
balances is irrelevant since the contract itself is
unambiguous and the balances are extrinsic to the specific
terms of the contract.
Finally, Appellants misconstrue the Bullough case
(Appellants' Brief, p. 9) in that the conduct of the parties
only becomes relevant after it has been determined that the
underlying contract is ambiguous and only then will the court_
look to extrinsic factors to determine what the contract meant.
In this case, however, there is no patent ambiguity and there
is nothing in the agreement which precludes Plaintiffs from
assuming the Pope Contract and from requiring Defendants to
convey title subject to such assumption.
The lower court was correct, therefore in concluding
that no ambiguity exited and that the matter was ripe for
summary judgment.
POINT II
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT
IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFFS SINCE THE CONTRACT PROVISIONS
CLEARLY REQUIRED CONVEYANCE BY DEFENDANTS OF THEIR
INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.
Appellants state that the lower court relied heavily upon
this Court's decision of Jones v. Hinkle, 611 P.2d 733 (Utah
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1980).

(Appellants' Brief, p. 10).

This "reliance" was

certainly justified since the Hinkle case is almost identical
to the present controversy.

As will be discussed infra,

Appellants' attempts to distinguish it are to no avail.
In Hinkle a purchaser brought action for specific performance of a real estate property contract.

The lower court

entered summary judgment in favor of the sellers and the purchasers appealed.

Both parties had moved for summary judgment

in the lower court.
The contract in Hinkle concerned residential property
located in Utah County.

The seller had a previous outstanding

mortgage with a savings and loan institution.

In paragraph 6

of the identical real estate contract utilized in this case
it was stated, "It is understood that there presently exists
an obligation against said property in favor of Deseret Federal
Savings & Loan with an unpaid balance of $31,836.78 as of
May 1, 1977."

The plaintiff made monthly payments and one

balloon payment in accordance with the terms of the contract
and then notified the defendants that since the balance on
the outstanding mortgage was below her contract price that
the sellers should convey title pursuant to paragraph 8 subject
only to the outstanding mortgage.

The defendants refused

to transfer title.
This Court rejected the argument that paragraph 8 only
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applied to obligations assumed after the contract's initiation and stated that it specifically applied to "any" loan
secured by the property and does not exclude existing mortgages.

This Court held that paragraph 8 was conditioned solely

upon the reduction of the unpaid principal to the amount of
the outstanding obligations and that once this amount had
been met defendants were obligated to convey in accordance
with the terms of the contract.
The purpose of paragraph 8 is to allow a seller who
retains title to the property the benefit of the property
by being able to still maintain or secure additional loans
based upon the property as security.

However, the

provision prevents the seller from encumbering the property
in excess of the value of the contract thereby protecting
the buyer from having encumbrances placed upon the property
which are in excess of the seller's interest.
As noted earlier, no attempt was made to modify either
paragraph 6 or paragraph 8 to exclude the Pope obligation
from the terms of paragraph 8.

It should be noted, on the

other hand, that the defendants in their contract with Pope
specifically precluded the sellers {Popes) from securing any
other additional loans besides the two outstanding obligations
already present at the time of sale.

{R. 10) ..

In this case,

however, no such language was contained and therefore the
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the defendants (who are now the sellers) were free to obtain
additional loans on the property at any time the Pope obligation dipped below the contract balance owing on the Thorpe
Contract.

In other words, the defendants had specifically

entered into provisions of a similar nature in the earlier
Pope Contract and therefore could just as easily have limited
the remedies available to the plaintiffs in the Thorpe Contract
had· they so desired.
Appellants argue that the contract is not "free from ambiguity" as in Hinkle.

(Appellants' Brief, p. 10).

Again, howev

if the language in the Hinkle case is examined and compared wit
the language in the instant case there is no ambiguity.

Instea

Appellants insist that this Court must "look behind the contrac
to other relevant

documents and extraneous evidence" (Appellan

Brief, p. 10) which requires, according to Appellants, that the
Pope obligation be excluded from paragraph 8.

As noted in the

prior section, however, courts do not attempt to create ambigui
by looking to extrinsic evidence but rather look to extrinsic
evidence to resolve- ambiguities present in the contract languag
itself.

Here, there is no such contractual ambiguity.

Appellants attempt by extrinsic arguments to show why
the Pope obligation was excluded from the paragraph language.
Again, these arguments are completely irrelevant unless the
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document itself is ambiguous.

However, even assuming rele-

vance arguendo the arguments do not support Defendants' claim
that the Pope obligation was meant to be excluded from the
paragraph 8 language.
First, Defendants argue that because the Pope Contract
included three houses which the Thorpe Contract did not that
the parties could not have intended the Pope obligation to be
included in paragraph 8.

Appellants state:

"It would be

impractical to attempt to divide title to the property while
the entire title rests with Pope pending complete satisfaction
of the original obligation."

(Appellants' Brief, p. 11).

This statement completely ignores the fact that the Defendants
had already divided and segregated the three houses from the
remainder of the property when they sold the motel, restaurant,
and trailer park to the plaintiffs.

The legal descriptions

contained in the Thorpe Contract (R. 4) is completely different
from that contained in the Pope Contract.

(R. 21-22).

Paragraph 8 only required Defendants to deed to Plaintiffs
their interest in the property contained in the Thorpe Contract.
Defendants would not have been required to deed their interest
in the three houses since they were not included in the Thorpe
Contract and were not being purchased by Plaintiffs.

Thus,

Defendants would have given up nothing as to these three houses
nor was there any "practical" problem involved since a division
had already occurred.
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Next, Defendants assert that since other property was
secured in the Pope Contract it would have been unfair to
allow Plaintiffs to assume the obligation.
such argument makes no sense.

Again, however,

Defendants agreed to give to

the Popes liens on other real property in addition to the
motel, cafe, and trailer park involved in the transaction.
The contract provided that when the balance owing reached
$230,000 that the first property would be released and that
upon reaching $200,000 the second property would be released.
(R. 10).

The Popes were obligated to release these properties

regardless of whether the balance was reduced b¥ the payments
coming from Defendants or coming from Plaintiffs.

Had Plaintif

defaulted in their payments Defendants would have again assumed
the contract and continued to make payments.

In any event,

however, the defendants had agreed in the Pope Contract to a
specified payment

~nd

time schedule and the assumption by Plain

tiffs·, therefore,would not have altered this payment or time
schedule in any way.
The most that Defendants can complain about is the fact
that had they continued to receive the accelerated balloon
payments of Plaintiffs under the Thorpe Contract the defendants could have obtained a release of their properties sooner.
However, there is nothing in any of these contracts which
requires an earlier release or which states that Defendants
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must apply the accelerated payments corning from Plaintiffs
to the Pope Contract for the purpose of accelerating the
release of the two other properties.
Finally, the same argument is advanced by Defendants that
the assumption of the contract by Plaintiffs will preclude
the release of the three houses contained in the Pope· agreement
but excluded in the Thorpe agreement.
pp. 11-12).

(Appellants' Brief,

Again, there is no contractual language in either

contract giving Defendants a right to the early release of
these three properties.

It was completely optional on the

part of Defendants whether they wished to accelerate payments
under the Pope agreement or whether they wished to continue
under the payment schedule provided.
Likewise, there is nothing contained in the Thorpe Contract which condictions the accelerated balloon payments of
Plaintiffs for the purpose of paying off the Pope obligation
in an expedited manner.

While Defendants may well have intended

on applying the payments received from Plaintiffs entirely
to the Pope Contract there was no contractual obligation to
so do.

Plaintiffs cannot be now penalized simply because

Defendants' intention may have been thwarted by their failure
to provide contractual language to effectuate this claimed
desire.
The preceding attempts to distinguish the Hinkle case
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must fail.

None of these extrinsic facts or supposed desires

of the defendants are contained in the contract itself.

The

contract simply and plainly requires Defendants to convey
their interest in the contracted for property at the time
when the Pope obligation and the Thorpe obligation become
equal.

There is no doubt that this fact occurred or would

have occurred had the defendants accepted the tender made
by Plaintiffs to equalize the balances.

Thus, just as in

Hinkle, the lower court was correct in granting sununary judgment
and requiring the defendants to convey their interest in the
property subject to the Pope obligation.
POINT III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO AWARD
ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS AND THIS COURT
SHOULD ALSO AWARD ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS.
The lower court refused to grant to Plaintiffs attorneys'
fees or costs on the assumption that Plaintiffs had prepared
the document and therefore were not entitled to these expenditures.

(Tr. 49).

The respondents have cross-appealed from

this denial since the lower court was clearly erroneous in
precluding attorneys' fees and costs.
First, the fact that Plaintiffs prepared the agreement
1s irrelevant for purposes of determining attorneys' fees.
The question of who drafted an instrument 1s only germane
when an ambiguity exists in the language and then only to the
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extent that a presumption is made against the drafter.

Here,

the lower court specifically found no ambiguity as to the
assumption provision and Defendants did not ever argue an
ambiguity as to the attorneys' fees and costs provisions.
Thus, the facts that Plaintiffs prepared the contract by
filling in the printed form is completely irrelevant to an
award of attorneys' fees and costs.
Second, Defendants argue that the language contained in
the contract only permits attorneys' fees for a "default" and
that the court did not declare a default or breach of contract
by Appellants as pled by Respondents !.in ~heir :complaint.
(Appellants' Brief, p. 13).
This argument attempts to put form over substance.
Obviously, the court found that the defendant had breached
their obligation to convey the property to Plaintiffs and
ordered such conveyance to occur.

It is not necessary for

the court to specifically make a finding of a default or
breach in a motion for sununary judgment.

This Court in the

Hinkle case specifically held that attorneys' fees and costs
were required in a dispute involving the identical clauses.
This Court stated:
As to the award of attorneysi fees to
defendants, we reverse the trial court and
direct it to award such fees to plaintiffs.
The contract provides that the defaulting
party shall pay costs and expenses, including
a reasonable attorneys' fees incurred in
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enforcing the agreement.
Defendants were in
default for their failure to convey title
pursuant to Paragraph 8, and they are therefore
liable to Plaintiffs for the expenses of this
action.
611 P.2d 733, 736 (Utah 1980).
Finally, Appellants rely upon the case of Swain v. Salt
Lake Real Estate and Investment Co., 279 P.2d 709 (Utah 1955)
to state that attorneys' fees on appeal are discretionary with
the Supreme Court.

This reliance is misplaced since this

Court specifically overruled the Swain decision in Management
Services Corp. v. Development Associates, 617 P.2d 406 (Utah
1980) .

The Court stated the following concerning a question

of attorneys' fees on appeal in an action involving a real
estate contract:
The parties here agreed to pay reasonable
attorneys' fees if it became necessary to enforce
the contract.
If plaintiff is required to defend
its position on appeal at its own expense plaintiff's rights under the contract are thereby
diminished. We therefore adopt the rule of law
that a provision for payment of attorneys' fees
in a contract includes appeal as well as at trial,
if the action is brought to enforce the contract,
and overrule Swain and Downey State Bank on this
point insofar as they may be to the contrary.
Id.
at 409.
The lower court erred in failing to award a reasonable
attorneys' fee and costs to Plaintiffs.

In addition, this

Court should remand to the lower court for a determination
as to reasonable attorneys' fees and costs of this appeal.
CONCLUSION
Summary Judgment was developed as a means to eliminate
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an unnecessary trial when no question of fact exists.

Here,

there can be no doubt that summary judgment was proper unless
it can be said that a factual dispute is present.

A factual

dispute is present.only if this Court accepts Defendants'
argument that the contract on its face is ambiguous and
requires extrinsic factual evidence to determine the intent
of the parties.
The contract on its face, however, as a matter of law
is not ambiguous.
sistent.

Paragraph 6 and paragraph 8 are not incon-

Paragraph 6 merely states that Defendants were

obligated to make the payments as to the Pope Contract thereby eliminating any question as to who should make these underlying obligation payments.

However, paragraph 6 does not in

any way negate the effect of paragraph 8 which permits a
transfer of title upon the assumption by Plaintiffs of the
underlying obligation when the balances of the two contracts
have equalized. ·
The lower court was correct in finding that no ambiguity
existed in the contract language.

Further, the court correctly

applied the terms of the contract in accordance with this
Court's decision in Hinkle.

The supposed distinction between

this case and Hinkle are completely without merit and the
Hinkle case is binding precedent to the very issue now being
litigated.
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Finally, the lower court erred in failing to follow the
Hinkle decision as to attorneys' fees and costs and PlaintiffsRespondents are clearly entitled to these awards in order to
prevent a penalty being levied against them for enforcement
of their contract.

Likewise, this Court should order a remand

for purposes of determining reasonable attorneys' fees and
costs of this appeal.
Respectfully submitted,

Attorneys for PlaintiffsRespondents
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